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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT'S SEARCH AND SEIZURE
PROTECTION TO ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING
In Katz v. United States1 the petitioner was convicted in
the district court of transmitting wagering information by
telephone in violation of a federal statute.2 The government,
over the petitioner's objection,3 was allowed to introduce evi-
dence consisting of telephone conversations overheard by
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents through the use of
an electronic listening and recording device attached to the
outside of a public telephone booth. In affirming the convic-
tion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the re-
cording had not been obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment as there had been no physical entrance into the area
occupied by the petitioner. 4 The Supreme Court reversed. Al-
though there was no actual physical penetration of the area
occupied by the petitioner, the electronic listening device vio-
l 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1964). The statute provides in part:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or
wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility
for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of
bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers, . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than two years, or both.
3 The petitioner, relying on Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961), argued that the evidence obtained by re-
cording the conversation constituted an illegal search and
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment, and as such
was inadmissible. Evidence secured by an unlawful search
and seizure is inadmissible in federal courts by virtue of
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and this pro-
tection was extended to state courts by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
4 Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
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lated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied and thus
constituted an illegal search and seizure under the fourth
amendment.
The Court stated that in earlier cases it had "express-
ly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items but extends as well to the record-
ing of oral statements overheard without any 'technical tres-
pass . . . under local property law'."5 The Court then pro-
posed that the fourth amendment protects people and not
simply areas or places against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures. Following this line, the Court found that "the reach
of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence
of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."" Justice
Stewart writing for the majority7 concluded:
[T]hat the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman
have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that
the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer
be regarded as controlling. The Government's activi-
ties in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth
and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the
electronic device employed to achieve that end did
not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can
have no constitutional significance.8
In his lone dissent, Justice Black had a two-fold objection:
(1) I do not believe that the words of the Amend-
ments will bear the meaning given them by today's
decision and (2) I do not believe that it is the proper
5 389 U.S. at 353, quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961).
6 389 U.S. at 353.
7 The Court rendered a 7 to 1 decision with Justice Stewart
delivering the opinion of the Court. Justice White and Jus-
tice Douglas wrote concurring opinions, while Justice Black
wrote the lone dissent. Justice Marshall did not participate.
8 389 U.S. at 353.
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role of this Court to rewrite the Amendment in order
to bring it into harmony with the time and thus reach
a result that many people believe to be desirable.9
A perusal of the leading cases in this area reveals much
support for the dissent and shows that this new meaning and
interpretation given to the fourth amendment is in fact just
that-a new meaning and interpretation. It will further reveal
that this decision did not logically evolve through the "ero-
sion" of prior cases as the majority opinion suggests.
The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search-
es and seizures shall not be violated and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be search-
ed.10
"Persons, houses, papers and effects"". imply a mean-
ing of material, tangible objects capable of being both search-
ed and seized, and words, in their ordinary meaning, are in-
capable of either. The constitutional requirement of "parti-
cularly describing"' 2 is also incapable of being satisfied. While
it may be conceded that a future conversation can be de-
scribed, it is virtually impossible to describe a conversation
not yet held with any degree of specificity so as to satisfy
the "particularly describing" requirement.
In Carrol v. United States,13 the Court said that "the
Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what
was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted and in a manner which will conserve public inter-
est as well as the interest and right of individual citizens."
9 Id. at 364.
10 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
11 Id.
12 Id.
L3 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1924).
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On the surface, this statement appears to be incompatible
with the strongly held belief that the Constitution is a "liv-
ing document" designed to meet needs that were unknown
at the time it was written, but that is not so.
At the time of the adoption of the fourth amendment,
electronic listening and recording devices were, of course, un-
known. Eavesdropping, however, was not unknown at that
time. The Supreme Court in Berger v. United States14 rec-
ognized eavesdropping as an "ancient practice" which was
condemned as a nuisance at common law. "At one time the
eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses
or their windows seeking out private discourse."'G Tradition-
ally evidence obtained by eavesdroppers has been admitted
both in American and English courts. The test for admissi-
bility has not been how and by whom it was obtained but
whether it was relevant and obtained by first-hand knowl-
edge.16 Since the evidence obtained by eavesdropping by an
individual is admissible, it is hard to see the rationale in re-
jecting proferred eavesdropped evidence obtained by the use
of a machine. Practically and realistically speaking, the use
of modern electronic devices to listen in on a conversation
is nothing more than the "ancient" variety of eavesdropping
refined to a greater degree of efficiency.
The framers of the Constitution must certainly have been
aware of this "ancient" practice and could easily have word-
ed the amendment so that it included overheard conversa-
tions had they desired to do so. Their historical purpose was
basically to prevent the use of government-force in breaking
into people's homesan-i-&bother buildin-, searching, ransack-
ing and seizing p-ersonal belongings without a proper war-
rant. It is in this area that the Court shou-d and does give
the amendmenff'a liberal construction in order to prevent war-
34 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
15 Id. at 45 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 168).
16 Id. at 71, 72 (Black, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 6, No. 2
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rantless searches and seizures of tangible property. It has
been said in opinions that the fourth amendment should "be
liberally construed to effect the purpose of the framers of
the Constitution in the interests of liberty".17 "But," as Justice
Taft so succinctly stated in Olmstead v. United States,8 "that
cannot justify enlargement of the language employed beyond
the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers and
effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to for-
bid hearing or sight".
The first time the Supreme Court considered the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment to electronic listening devices
was in Olmstead v. United States,19 a wiretapping case. There
the Court in no uncertain terms held that the securing of evi-
dence through the use of wiretapping did not violate the fourth
amendment. The basis for the Court's decision was that the
words of the amendment could not be construed to encompass
eavesdropping. The Court said: "[T]he Amendment itself
shows that the search is to be of material things - the person,
the house, his papers or his effects. The description of the
warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful, is that it
must specify the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized .. ". . ,0 According to the majority, there was
nothing "seized" and nothing "searched" and the evidence was
obtained only through the sense of hearing.
17 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928). (Justice
Taft referring to opinions by Justice Bradley in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885) and Justice Clarke in
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920).)
18 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
19 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
20 Id. at 464-65. Mr. Justice Taft went on to say:
The language of the Amendment cannot be extended and
expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole
world from the defendant's house or office. The intervening
wires are not part of his house any more than are the high-
ways along which they are stretched.
19701
5
Bosch: The Applicability of the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Pr
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1969
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
In Goldman v. United States,21 a case strickingly similar
to the case at hand, the Court reaffirmed the position taken
in Olmstead. Here a detectaphone had been placed on the wall
of an adjoining room by federal agents, and they recorded the
overheard conversations. The evidence, so obtained, was held
to be admissible as eavesdropping; therefore, it did not consti-
tute a fourth amendment violation.
The majority in Katz heavily relied on Silverman v. Unit-
ed States.22 Their contention was that Silverman expressly
holds "that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the record-
ing of oral statements, overheard without any 'technical tres-
pass under . . . local property law'."' '
The petitioner's counsel in Silverman urged the Court to
reconsider the Goldman and Olmstead decisions and to re-
examine the rationale behind those decisions. This the Court
expressly refused to do. Since the basis for Goldman and Olin-
stead was that conversations could neither be searched nor
seized and since the Court expressly refused to overrule or
even re-examine those cases, it is hard to see how the Court
arrived at its conclusion. It does not "follow," as the Court sug-
gests in Wong Sun v. United States,24 that "from our hold-
ing in Silverman v. United States that the Fourth Amendment
may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as
well as against the more traditional seizure of papers and ef-
fects."
The reason that the evidence in the Silverman case was ex-
cluded, as Justice Black suggests,2 5 is because of the exclusion-
21 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
22 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
2 389 U.S. at 353, quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961).
24 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).
25 389 U.S. at 369 (Black, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 6, No. 2
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ary rule formulated in Weeks v. United States.26 According
to Justice Black, the Court has adopted an exclusionary rule to
bar evidence obtained by means of an unauthorized intrusion
regardless of whether there was a search or seizure in violation
of the fourth amendment. "This exclusionary rule . . .rests
on the 'supervisory power' of this Court over Federal Courts
and is not rooted in the Fourth Amendment.'2 7 Another case
relied on by the majority is Warden v. Haydon.28 This case is
cited to show that the fourth amendment is not limited to
searches and seizures of tangible property but also covers in-
tangibles as well. That interpretation is supposed to be gleaned
from the statement: "The premise that property interests con-
trol the right of the government to search and seize has been
discredited. 12 9 Warden v. Haydon, however, was a case deal-
ing not with intangibles such as conversations but with the
seizure of clothes-tangible property. The "property interests"
related not to an issue of tangible or intangible items but dealt
with the common law rule that the right of seizure depended
upon proof of a superior property interest and is inapplicable
here.
Although the Court clearly states t h a t "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
'right to privacy',"3 0 that appears to be exactly what the Court
is trying to do. For years the Supreme Court or its individual
members have equated the fourth amendment with a right
to privacy. This can be seen in early cases such as Boyd v.
United States,31 later in Weeks v. United States,32 and in Mr.
26 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27 389 U.S. at 369 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Wolf v. Colo-
rado 338 U.S. 25, 39 (1949) (concurring opinion); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (concurring opinion).
28 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
29 Id. at 304.
30 389 U.S. at 350.
31 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
32 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
19701
7
Bosch: The Applicability of the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Pr
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1969
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Justice Brandeis' oft quoted dissent in the Olmstead case
where he goes so far as to say that "every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the indi-
vidual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment."38 The basis for the recent
Berger v. New York 4 decision was that the fourth amend-
ment "right to privacy" had been violated.
It is this growing tendency to equate the fourth amend-
ment with a right to privacy protection that is the real basis
for the Katz decision and has given the fourth amendment a
new interpretation that it was never meant to have and never
should have had.
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the
extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches of "per-
sons, houses, papers and effects". No general right is
created by the Amendment so as to give this Court the
unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything
which affects privacy. Certainly the Framers, well ac-
quainted as they were with the excesses of govern-
mental power, did not intend to grant this Court such
omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The history
of governments proves that it is dangerous to free-
dom to repose such powers in courts.3 5
The function of the Supreme Court is to interpret the
Constitution, not to rewrite it. The Constitution has left the
job of making laws to Congress. The Supreme Court first de-
clared evidence obtained by an electronic device inadmissable
in federal courts in Nardone v. United States, 30 a wiretapping
case. This case, however, was not decided on constitutional
grounds but on a statute, the Federal Communication Act of
-3 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
34 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
31 389 U.S. at 374 (Black, J., dissenting).
36 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
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